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在破译任何国家之间的贸易关系时,退回并首先将一切都放入历史背景中总是有帮助的。为此,EE Times转向国际治理创新中心(加拿大滑铁卢)高级高级管理人员Dieter Ernst东西方中心(檀香山)。恩斯特是一位经济学家,也是中国的长期观察员,以研究中国,美国和新兴经济体的工业和创新政策而着称,其重点是标准和知识产权。

In the following interview, Ernst predicts, “The damage done by this outbreak of open technology warfare is likely to be much more serious and long-lasting than normally assumed in the media.”在接下来的采访中,恩斯特预测,“开放式技术战争造成的破坏可能比媒体通常认为的更为严重和持久。”

Ernst, who just came back from field research in China's AI industry, also shed some light on the likely impact of the trade war on AI technology development.恩斯特刚刚从中国人工智能行业的实地研究中回归,也对人工智能技术发展可能发生的战争有所了解。

Historical context 历史背景

EE Times: With Trump's executive order in and the US's increasing hardline stance against China, where do you see US-China trade relations today, compared to almost 20 years ago when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO)? EE Times: 随着特朗普在美国的行政命令越来越强硬对待中国的立场,与近20年前中国加入世界贸易组织(WTO)相比,您认为今天的中美贸易关系在哪里?


For US business, the rapprochement to China promised access to the potentially huge China market and to its cheap labor. The US government had banned trade with China until the early 1970s. However, with the full normalization of diplomatic and commercial relations in 1979, the United States became the second-largest importer to China and, in 1986, was China's third-largest partner in overall trade.美国政府直到1970年才禁止与中国的贸易。然而,随着1979年外交和商业关系的完全正常化,The美国成为中国的第二大进口国,1986年是中国在整体贸易中的第三大合作伙伴。

China's entry into WTO in 2001 was meant to accelerate the country's integration into international trade, with a particular focus on its rapidly growing role as the global electronics factory. The rest is history. In 2018, China was the United States' largest US merchandise trading partner (total trade at $660 billion), third-largest export market ($120 billion), and largest source of imports ($540 billion). China is also the largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities (at $1.1 trillion year-end 2018). 1中国进入中国是美国2001年加入世界贸易组织的最大美国国家。该国正在融入国际贸易,尤其关注其作为全球电子工厂的迅速发展作用。中国也是美国国债的最大外国持有者(2018年年底为1.1万亿美元)(贸易总额为6,600亿美元),第三大出口市场(1200亿美元),以及最大的进口来源(5400亿美元)。

US foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has grown rapidly, culminating in a US FDI stock in China through 2017 at $256 billion, compared to China's FDI stock in the US of $140 billion. 2 As a result, both economies are deeply intertwined into multi-layered global corporate networks of production and innovation.美国在中国的外国直接投资(FDI)增长迅速,到2017年美国对华直接投资总额达到2560亿美元,而中国在美国的外国直接投资存量为1400亿美元因此,这两个经济体都深深地交织在一起。多层次的全球企业生产和创新网络。

EE Times: What has changed now? EE Times:现在发生了什么变化?

Ernst: The rise of US economic nationalism, as embodied in Trump's “America First” doctrine, has drastically changed America's China policy. In a fundamental break with established US trade diplomacy, the new US trade dogma is ostensibly predicated on the fundamental arguments of mercantilism that trade is essentially a zero-sum game, and hence, an optimal policy is to ensure that exports exceed imports in any bilateral trade relation. Add to this a fundamental belief that US security requires unchallenged leadership in science and technology. 恩斯特:正如特朗普的“美国第一”学说所体现的那样,美国经济民族主义的兴起极大地改变了美国的对华政策。与美国现有的先进技术有着根本的突破。除此基本原则信念是零和游戏必不可少的概念的一部分,最佳政策是确保出口在任何双边贸易关系中超过进口。

China's efforts to forge ahead in advanced manufacturing and services are considered to be a major threat. China, thus, has become a strategic competitor — an “adversarial nation and bad actor” that should no longer be allowed “to steal our ideas, copy our technology, and cheat their way to leadership — in a field central to our national security.”因此,中国已经成为一个战略竞争者 - 一个不再受人喜爱的“对抗性国家和坏人”技术,并欺骗他们的领导方式 - 在我们国家安全的核心领域。“

'Entity List' '实体清单'
These words are now followed by action. On May 15, the battle against China culminated in Trump's executive order to ban American telecommunications firms from installing Huawei or ZTE equipment. However, even more important is a rule announced on the same day by the Commerce Department. This rule has placed Huawei and 68 affiliates in more than two dozen countries on its so-called “Entity List,” which is basically a trade blacklist that bars anyone on it from buying parts and components from US companies without the government's approval first. Obtaining such approval is practically impossible. According to a Federal Register posting, “The US government will review license applications under a policy presumption of denial.” This rule takes effect immediately, which indicates how serious the US government is in its goal to weaken, if not destroy, Huawei.这个词现在紧随其后。5月15日,与中国的战斗最终导致特朗普的行政命令禁止美国电信公司安装华为或中兴设备。这条规则已被放置在华为和其所谓的“实体名单”中的二十多个国家的68名员工中,这基本上是一个交易黑名单,禁止任何人在没有治理批准的情况下从美国公司购买组件和组件。对联邦公报的帖子的确认,“美国政府将根据拒绝的政策预防措施审查许可证申请。”这条规则立即生效,表明世界的状况如果不破坏,华为。

'Temporary general license' '临时一般许可'
A few days later, on May 21, the US Commerce Department scaled back some of these restrictions, issuing a 90-day “temporary general license ,” valid through Aug. 19. This temporary license is allowing sales and services provided to Huawei and affiliates to support existing Huawei handsets as well as existing networks and equipment. Maintenance arrangements made between Huawei and customers up to May 16 for existing networks and equipment fall under the moratorium. It is important to emphasize, however, that Huawei is still barred from buying American components to manufacture new products without license approvals that likely will be denied.几天后,即5月21日,美国商务部缩减了部分限制, 签发了为期90天的“临时一般许可证 ”,有效期至8月19日。该临时许可证允许向华为及其同事提供销售和服务。截至5月16日华为与客户之间的维护安排对于现有的网络和设备属于暂停状态。重要的是要强调,强调华为未经许可批准生产新产品的组件可能会被拒绝。

All-out technology war 全面的技术战争
In short, there is no indication that the US strategy has changed. US-China trade relations will continue to be shaped by an all-out technology war. The US Government is drastically tightening the export control of a broad portfolio of information technologies, with a focus on China. Since August 2018, the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) requires the Commerce Department to create lists of “emerging” and “foundational” technologies that are essential to US national security. This legislation had bipartisan sponsorship and was passed by both houses of Congress. Many provisions of the ECRA are still under development and will be rolled out over the next year or more. It seems that the restricted technologies will include a broad set of generic technologies, such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, self-driving vehicles, nanotechnology, robotics, and semiconductors. While any new regulations will require private sector review and input before going into place, the list of美中贸易关系将继续受到全面技术战争的影响。美国政府正在大幅收紧对广泛的信息技术组合的出口管制,自2018年8月起,“出口管制改革法案”(ECRA)要求商务部制定对美国国家安全至关重要的“新兴”和“基础”技术清单4该立法获得了两党赞助,并获得通过国会两院的许多条款仍在制定中,并将在明年或更长时间内推出。似乎受限制的技术将包括一系列通用技术,如人工智能,虽然任何新法规都要求私营部门在投入使用之前进行审查和投入,但列出的是驱动车辆,纳米技术机器人半导体。 restricted technologies is likely to be quite extensive.限制技术可能相当广泛。

'Deemed exports' '视为出口'
Add to this the US Treasury's Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) that drastically expands the mandate of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS).   Of particular importance are restrictions on so-called “deemed exports,” which limit any information about a controlled technology to a foreign national. Once these restrictions are implemented, they will throw a wrench into the existing pattern of knowledge sharing that is the lifeblood of the global IT industry. This unprecedented arsenal of technology export restrictions is bound to constrain China's options to use off-the-shelf chips from leading US and other foreign vendors. 2018年美国外国投资风险评估法案(FIRRMA)大大扩展了美国外国投资委员会(CFIUS)的授权。特别重要的是对所谓的“视为出口”的限制。一旦实施了这些限制,它们将被包含在关于全球IT受控生命信息的现有知识共享模式中。限制中国选择使用领先的美国和其他外国供应商的现成芯片

Mutual distrust 相互不信任
In short, mutual distrust and sometimes open hostility are now shaping US-China relations. On the US side, trade diplomacy seems to have given way to a “regime change” agenda. The current “China bashing” mood in Washington, DC, reflects a broad consensus among US defense, foreign policy, and economic policy-making elites that China's rise in information technology poses a serious threat to America's leadership in science and advanced technology. In this view, the US needs to implement aggressive trade, investment, technology, and visa restrictions to contain China's technological and geopolitical ambitions. This consensus embraces the political spectrum. Both Republicans and Democrats share it, and it will persist even if Trump does not win the 2020 election.在美国方面,贸易外交似乎已经让位于“政权更迭”议程。华盛顿特区目前的“中国抨击”情绪反映,简而言之,相互不信任和某种公开敌意正在塑造美中关系。美国国防,外交政策和经济政策制定精英的广泛共识表明,中国信息技术的崛起对美国在科学和先进技术领域的领导地位构成严重威胁。这种共识包含了政治光谱。共和党人和民主党人共享它,即使特朗普没有赢得2020年大选,它也将持续存在,并且签证限制将遏制中国的技术和地缘政治野心。

EE Times: What damage, if any, has the current administration done to the US-China trade and, more broadly, to the global semiconductor market? In other words, who will be more likely to suffer in what ways? EE Times: 现任政府对美中贸易,更广泛地说,对全球半导体市场造成了什么样的损害?换句话说,谁更有可能以更多的方式遭受损失?

Ernst: The damage done by this outbreak of open technology warfare is likely to be much more serious and long-lasting than normally assumed in the media. All participants in the global semiconductor industry will be affected, irrespective of their nationality.全球半导体行业的所有参与者都将受到影响,其国籍不可逆转。 恩斯特:这次爆发技术战的爆发可能比媒体通常认为的更为严重和持久。

There is no doubt that US technology export restrictions will slow down China's efforts to catch up in “emerging” and “foundational” technologies.毫无疑问,美国的技术出口限制将减缓中国追赶“新兴”和“基础”技术的努力。

· 2019-05-22 21:15  本新闻来源自:EETIMES,版权归原创方所有

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